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JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND
THE THIRD LAW OF MOTION
STEVEN LUBET*
[A] person does not surrender his constitutional right to freedom of
speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office.
-Hon. William H. Stafford, 1990'
For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.
-Newton's Third Law of Motion, 16872
[A certain judge is an] evil, unfair witch.
-Attorney Sean Conway, 2007'
We have come a long time indeed from the days of the sec-
ond Justice John Marshall Harlan (1955-1971), who was said to
have refrained from voting in presidential and other elections
for fear of prejudicing his neutrality in deciding cases.4 Today,
state and federal judges at all levels are far more outspoken
about their political and social views-writing books, making
speeches, and granting interviews with the press. The greatest
turn toward volubility has been in the realm of state judicial
elections.
Once relatively staid affairs, characterized largely by deco-
rum and near invisibility, judicial elections have lately become
ever more expensive and hard fought, generating pitched ideo-
logical battles over questions of judicial philosophy. In this
increasingly politicized atmosphere, it is now common for judi-
cial candidates to boast of their "pro-business" or "anti-crime"
credentials and to announce their views on legal issues ranging
from punitive damages to abortion rights.
* Williams Memorial Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Thanks
to Kenneth Mallory, Northwestern University School of Law, 2009, for research
assistance.
1. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
2. ISAAC NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIae NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
[MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHV] 14 (3d ed. 1726) (1687),
reprinted in I IsAAc NEWTON'S Principia 55 (Alexandre Koyre & I. Bernard Cohen
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1972).
3. Jordana Mishory, Judge-Blasting Lauryer Fights Investigation, LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, Dec. 21, 2007, at 4.
4. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 190 (2006) (quoting BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETH-
REN 127 (1979)).
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For many years, the Code of Judicial Conduct5 (CJC) exer-
cised a strong moderating influence on judicial campaigns. First
promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1972 and even-
tually adopted (although often in modified form) by every state,
the CJC provided that a judicial candidate must not "make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or]
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues."6 Many
judicial candidates-both incumbents and challengers-chafed
under the CJC's restraints, arguing that they were constitution-
ally entitled to speak their minds in the course of judicial elec-
tions.7 Eventually, that position achieved critical mass, as
academic commentators and judges alike took up the banner of
"free speech for judges." Finally, in 2002, the United States
Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, rul-
ing that the so-called "announce" clause was indeed unconstitu-
tional as applied to electoral campaigns.8 Current versions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit only "pledges, promises, or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial perform-
ance of the adjudicative duties ofjudicial office," and then only if
they touch upon "cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to
come before the court."' But even that limitation has been
challenged.1
Thus, we have entered a new era of judicial free speech, in
which incumbents and candidates for judicial office are permit-
ted-indeed, encouraged-to state their views rather bluntly
regarding law-related controversies. In some states, judicial elec-
tions have begun to resemble ordinary political campaigns, as
candidates compete for votes (and contributions) as though they
were running for legislative or executive offices. Many of the old
guard have grumbled at this development, but the change is
clearly here to stay. In the wake of the Supreme Court's White
decision, judicial candidates have constantly pushed the envel-
ope, asserting broader and broader interpretations of the right
to judicial campaign speech and usually prevailing in court.
5. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007). There have been three full
versions of the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, promulgated by the American Bar
Association in 1972, 1990, and 2007. Some version of the Model Code--whether
modified or in toto--has been adopted in every state, as well as by the United
States Judicial Conference.
6. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972).
7. See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir.
1993).
8. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A) (13) (2007).
10. See, e.g., Ind. Right to Life v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The purpose of this short essay is not to discuss the wisdom
of wide-open judicial campaigns (though I think they are regret-
table) or to address the constitutionality of various states'
attempts to hold the line (which appear mostly doomed to fail).
Instead, I will simply point out that every action has an equal and
opposite reaction, and that judges' collective embrace and enjoy-
ment of unfettered campaign speech will not come without some
unpleasant consequences. Those who live by free expression may
die by free expression, and judges should not be surprised if they
soon find themselves on the receiving end of verbal assaults that
were once considered well off limits.
I. AN INCOMPLETE BUT BASICALLY ADEQUATE HISTORY OF
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH
In the early years of the Republic, there was no judicial cam-
paign speech, simply because there were no judicial elections.
Federal judges, of course, have always been nominated by the
President subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. And
while Supreme Court confirmation hearings have lately taken on
many of the nastier trappings of electoral campaigns, that is a
recent phenomenon, dating only to the Robert Bork nomination
in 1987 or the Thurgood Marshall nomination in 1967 (depend-
ing on one's political perspective). Less well known is the fact
that nearly all state court judges were also appointed (in some
states by the governor and in others by the legislature) until the
early 1830s.
Only with the advent of Jacksonian democracy did there
come a call for the popular election of state court judges, on the
theory that elected judges would be less dominated by
entrenched powers and more accountable to the public. The
Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided for the election of certain
lower courtjudges. 1' In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to
elect all of its judges.1 2 Other states followed suit, including New
York in 1846, and by 1860, twenty-four of the thirty-four states
elected their judges.' 3 In 1909, thirty-five states (out of forty-six)
chose judges in partisan elections. 4 The early twentieth century
11. LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFIELD, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), available at http://www.ajs.org/
selection/docs/Berkson.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Its Impli-
cations for the Future of an Independent Judiciary 4 (Indiana Univ. Sch. of Law-
Bloomington Legal Studies Research Paper No. 85, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=101 2963.
428 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22
also saw the beginning of a reaction against party-dominated
elections, as about a dozen states (including Illinois) experi-
mented with non-partisan elections.' 5 In 1940, Missouri became
the first state to go a step further, adopting a system of commis-
sion recommendation and gubernatorial appointment, followed
by a "retention ballot," in which the judge runs unopposed. Vari-
ations on the "Missouri Plan" are now in use for some judicial
offices in thirty-three states; another five states use gubernatorial
or legislative appointment without commission recommenda-
tions. 16
Today, thirty-nine states elect some or all of their judges
(including retention elections) while eleven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia use exclusively appointive systems.17 The
nature ofjudicial campaigns can vary as widely as the methods of
selection, though of course they tend to be the most hotly con-
tested and expensive in the twenty-one states (eight partisan and
thirteen nonpartisan) that elect the judges of their highest
courts.1 8
Elected judiciaries have always generated controversies,
which have sometimes been far reaching. In the spring of 1860,
for example, the Republican Party of Ohio declined to re-nomi-
nate Joseph R. Swan, then the sitting chief justice of the state's
supreme court, because he had declined to issue a writ of habeas
corpus for two men convicted in federal court of violating the
Fugitive Slave Act.19 Such a ruling would have resulted in a con-
frontation between state and federal courts, which was much
desired by ardent abolitionists but dreaded by moderate Union-
ists. Ohio's Republican governor, Salmon P. Chase, waffled on
the issue. At one point he announced that he would enforce a
state-court-issued writ of habeas corpus, even against federal mar-
shals, but he later supported Swan's decision to defer to federal
authorities in fugitive slave cases.2" The electoral abandonment
of Chief Justice Swan split the Ohio Republican Party, which in
turn meant that Chase was not able to lead a united delegation to
the party's national nominating convention in Chicago. When
15. Berkson & Caufield, supra note 11, at 2.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See ELMO B. HUNTER CITIZENS CTR. FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION, AM. JUDI-
CATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERALJURIS-
DICTION COURTS (2007), http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/udicial%20
Selection %20Charts.pdf.
18. See id. at 3.
19. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 136-37 (1995).
20. See Steven Lubet, Slavery on Trial: The Case of the Oberlin Rescue, 54 ALA.
L. REV. 785, 826 (2003).
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the leading candidate, William H. Seward of New York, could not
gain a majority on the first ballot, Chase might otherwise have
been the logical nominee. As it was, however, the united Illinois
delegation succeeded in swinging the nomination to Abraham
Lincoln.21
In 1913, William Howard Taft (former president and later
Chief Justice of the United States) condemned judicial elections
as "shocking, and ... out of keeping with the fixedness of moral
principles."22 A decade later, Chief Justice Taft chaired the
American Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Ethics, which
produced the first Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924. Although
the Canons were for the most part aspirational and hortatory,
they came down firmly on the side of limiting campaign speech:
"A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer
others to make for him, promises of conduct in office which
appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing
power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of
law on disputed issues .... 23
The Canons' political speech restriction was not considered
controversial in 1924, and it was carried over (in somewhat less
precatory language) in the American Bar Association's 1972
Code of Judicial Conduct, where the limitation remained for the
next two decades. 4
II. NEW RIGHTS FOR OPPRESSED JUDGES
In the early 1990s, it became increasingly common for judi-
cial candidates to challenge the strictures of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. One of the first successful challengers was Illinois
appellate court Justice Robert Buckley, who, in his campaign for
a seat on the state's supreme court, had circulated literature stat-
ing that he had "never written an opinion reversing a rape con-
viction. ' 25 Interpreting Buckley's statement as a pledge of
conduct, the Illinois Court Commission sanctioned him pursuant
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 7(B) (1) (c), which, at that time,
was Illinois's version of the Code ofJudicial Conduct.26 Although
no penalty was imposed on Buckley for the violation, he brought
21. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS 248-49 (2005).
22. William Howard Taft, The Selection and Tenure ofJudges, 7 ME. L. REV.
203, 208 (1914) (originally presented at a meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion, Sept. 1-3, 1913).
23. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
24. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1972).
25. Barbara E. Reed, Tripping the Rift: Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines
in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER L. REV. 971, 974 (2005).
26. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)(1)(c) then provided that:
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suit in federal court to enjoin future enforcement of the provi-
sion. The Seventh Circuit agreed with Buckley, holding that the
Illinois rule reached "far beyond speech that could reasonably be
interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would
compromise his impartiality should he be successful in the elec-
tion," and was therefore constitutionally overbroad.27
Similar cases were brought in other jurisdictions, with mixed
success for the challengers. In the meantime, many states modi-
fied their campaign speech limitations, frequently adopting the
revised language of the 1990 Code of Judicial Conduct, which
had dropped the "announce" clause, while retaining the prohibi-
tion on "pledges and promises."2 Nine states, however, includ-
ing Minnesota, retained the "announce clause, ' 29 thus setting the
scene for Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which reached the
United States Supreme Court in 2002.
In White, the Supreme Court held simply that the Minnesota
rule "prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announc-
ing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates the
First Amendment."3 Although the Court specifically declined to
opine on other common campaign speech restrictions, it was
obvious that White had altered the landscape of judicial free
speech. Much litigation ensued.
In Weaver v. Bonner,"' for example, the Eleventh Circuit
extended White's holding to the "misrepresent" clause by invali-
[A] candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office fil-
led by election or retention... should not make pledges or promises
of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues; or misrepresent his identity... or other fact; provided,
however, that he may announce his views on measures to improve the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if, in doing so,
he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue
that may come before him.
Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (striking
down this rule).
27. Id. at 228.
28. Canon 5(A) (3) (d) of the 1990 Code provides that judges and candi-
dates may not,
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come
before the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties
of the office [or] knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications,
present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an
opponent.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (1990).
29. Reed, supra note 25, at 982.
30. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
31. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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dating a Georgia Supreme Court rule that prohibited "material
misrepresentation [s] of fact or law"32 with regard to the positions
of a candidate's opponent. Likewise, in Family Trust Foundation of
Kentucky v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, the Sixth Circuit
applied White's rationale to uphold an injunction against Ken-
tucky's "pledges and promises" and "commit" clauses, which had
been adapted from the 1990 Code of Judicial Conduct." The fol-
lowing year, a federal district judge in North Dakota reached the
same conclusion: "There is little question," said the court, "that
the 'pledges and promises clause,' and the 'commitment clause'
contained in Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) and (ii) essentially forbid the
same speech that the United States Supreme Court held was con-
stitutionally protected in White, namely, speech announcing views
on disputed legal and political issues."34 The Eighth Circuit, con-
sidering the remaining issues in White on remand from the
Supreme Court, went even further and invalidated Minnesota's
restrictions on partisan political activities and direct fundraising
by judicial candidates. 35
Some courts have not read White so broadly,36 declining to
extend its holding to provisions such as the "pledges" and "com-
32. Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B) (1) (d) provided that a
candidate
shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communi-
cation which the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material mis-
representation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading or
which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the
candidate can achieve.
Id. at 1315.
33. Family Trust Foundation of Ken. v. Ken. Judicial Conduct Comm'n,
388 F.3d 224, 228 (6th Cir. 2004). Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300 pro-
vided that
[a] judge or a candidate for election to judicial office . . . shall not
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; shall not make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before
the court; and shall not misrepresent any candidate's identity, qualifi-
cations, present position, or other facts.
Id. at 227.
34. N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (D.N.D.
2005).
35. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
36. E.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65
(2d Cir. 2003); Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 130
S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2003); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003); In re Dunleavy,
838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003).
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mitments" clauses, both of which were retained in the ABA's
2007 revision of the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct.3 7 Nonetheless,
the movement has essentially been in one direction, as was aptly
summarized by Professor Charles Geyh: "In the aftermath of
White, judicial candidates have challenged remaining restrictions
on their campaign speech and conduct in the lower courts, and
while the results have been somewhat mixed, the trend has
favored the challengers."
38
III. FREE SPEECH AND OTHER UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Perhaps the apogee of judicial free speech has been the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Jenevein v. Willing, in which the court
appeared to have applied White to almost anything ajudge might
want to say.39 A Texas trial court judge named Robert Jenevein
had been censured by the state's Commission on Judicial Con-
duct for holding a televised press conference in his chambers, at
which he "read a prepared statement concerning [a pending
case] and his personal feelings and criticisms about the conduct
of [one of the lawyers] and his clients in connection with that
still-pending case," in violation of the Texas Code of Judicial
Conduct.4" Citing White, the Fifth Circuit ordered the Texas
Commission to expunge the order of censure on the ground that
Judge Jenevein's televised remarks-which were extensive and
quite personal-had been protected by the First Amendment.4"
This ruling is significant because it extended White well
beyond the specific context of campaigning. Although no elec-
tion was in process at the time ofJenevein's press conference, the
Fifth Circuit determined that it nonetheless constituted an
"elected official's speech to his constituency" and therefore fell
37. Rule 4.1 of the 2007 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct provides that candi-
dates for judicial office shall not "knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, make any false or misleading statement" and "in connection with cases,
controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges,
promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance
of the adjudicative duties ofjudicial office." MODEL CODE OFJUDICtAL CONDUCT
R. 4.1(A) (2007).
38. Geyh, supra note 14, at 12.
39. Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007).
40. Id. at 556. Specifically, Judge Jenevein was censured pursuant to
Texas Canon 2B, which provides that a "judge shall not lend the prestige of
judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others." TEXAS
CODE OF JUDICAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2006). The Fifth Circuit held that this
amounted to a speech restriction as applied to Judge Jenevein's televised com-
ments. Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 562.
41. Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 560.
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within the ambit of White.4 2 In other words, it would appear that
elected judges are always campaigning, at least for the purpose of
applying the White decision. If followed by other courts, the
Jenevein approach would make it unlikely that sitting judges could
ever be subjected to speech restrictions of any sort.4"
While the total demise of speech limitations may gladden
hearts on the bench, the theory of open communications
between officials and their constituents would also result in some
disagreeable consequences for the judiciary. Consider Rule
8.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which has
been adopted in most states and provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifi-
cations or integrity of ajudge ... or of a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office."4 4
Judges have not been hesitant in the past to apply this rule
to disrespectful attorneys, on the theory that judicial dignity
requires lawyerly deference. The Indiana Supreme Court, for
example, suspended a young lawyer for the trivial (in my opin-
ion) offense of including an impolite (though not insulting,
again in my opinion) footnote in an appellate brief.4 5 In In re
Pyle, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended a lawyer who had
mailed a letter to several hundred friends, clients, and family
members claiming that a prior disciplinary proceeding had been
"stacked against" him.4 6 The letter, according to the Kansas
court, had constituted "false statements of fact about Board
members' qualifications and integrity."4" In In re De Maio, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals suspended a lawyer for the
"false, spurious, and inflammatory" statement that a judge had
"refus[ed] to administer the law" and had violated his "oath of
office."4 In all, Rule 8.2(a) appears to have been invoked by
reviewing courts at least several dozen times since 2000, and that
42. Id. at 558.
43. The Fifth Circuit did leave open the possibility thatJenevein could be
properly censured for conducting the press conference in his courtroom while
wearing his judicial robe. Id. at 560.
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2003). A minority of
jurisdictions have adopted versions of the previous Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, in which Disciplinary Rule 8-102(A) is to the same effect.
45. See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2002), modified on reh'g, 782
N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003) (suspending attorney Michael Wilkins for thirty days for
misconduct). The court subsequently lifted the suspension, while maintaining
the finding of misconduct.
46. In re Pyle, 156 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Kan. 2007).
47. Id. at 1244.
48. In re De Maio, 893 A.2d 583, 585 (D.C. 2006).
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does not count cases that resulted in informal sanctions or pri-
vate reprimands, much less situations where lawyers bit their lips
for fear of facing discipline.
Most recently, a Florida lawyer-blogger named Sean Conway
was served with a disciplinary complaint for referring to a state
trial judge as an "evil, unfair witch" with an "ugly, condescending
attitude" and suggesting that she is "seemingly mentally ill."49
Those are vicious words, indeed, hardly calculated to win friends
among the judiciary. In the pre-White days, there would have
been a plausible argument in favor of disciplining Conway, on
the theory that the state has a compelling public interest in
preventing slurs against its judges. Florida judges are elected,
however, and in the post-Jenevein era it seems obvious that "con-
stituents" are entitled to speak their minds regarding "elected
officials," even if they are not in the midst of a campaign.
From here, it is likely that life will only become more heated,
both for judges and their critics, as judicial campaigns, extracur-
ricular press conferences, and blogs go to ever further extremes.
There can be few if any rules, now that codes of conduct (both
judicial and lawyerly) have been either invalidated or sapped.
Ladies and gentlemen of the bench-whether you are ugly and
unfair, or photogenic and just-welcome to the marketplace of
ideas.
49. Mishory, supra note 3, at 4.
